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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-3077 
___________ 
  
KENNETH MURCHISON, 
                                             Appellant 
v. 
 
WARDEN LEWISBURG USP; UNKNOWN MEMBERS OF THE SORT TEAM; 
PHYSICIANS ASSISTANT POTTER; DR. PIGOS; LT. SEBA;  
WARDEN  THOMAS; LT.  SHERMAN, Correction Officer;  
COUNSELOR METZGER; EMT MCCLINTOC 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-11-cv-02285) 
District Judge:  Honorable Matthew W. Brann 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 28, 2015 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 5, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 Kenneth Murchison, an inmate proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s 
judgment dismissing the only claim remaining in his civil rights lawsuit and denying him 
leave to amend.  We will affirm. 
 As we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with this case, we need not 
recite the entire procedural or factual background.  Murchison’s operative complaint 
alleged causes of action “under the Federal Tort Claims Act” and Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), stemming from 
two incidents.  In the first, Murchison alleged that prison staff sexually assaulted, 
tortured, and then intentionally injured him by binding him too tightly in restraints, which 
resulted in restricted blood flow.  He also alleged that, while he was restrained, prison 
staff “forcefully [and] willfully stabb[ed] him with a diabetic lancet.”  And in connection 
with the first incident, Murchison alleged that prison staff retaliated against him by 
illegally reducing his pain medication.  In the second incident, Murchison alleged that 
prison staff, intentionally and with an intent to injure him, restrained him in a way that 
cut off blood circulation, and caused nerve damage, bruising, and scarring.  Murchison 
claimed that these incidents violated his rights under the First and Eighth Amendments. 
 The Magistrate Judge screened Murchison’s complaint as is required under 28 
U.S.C. § 1915A.  The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing any claim under the 
FTCA because Murchison did not name the United States as a defendant and, in addition, 
he only alleged constitutional tort claims.  The Magistrate Judge recommended 
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dismissing the remaining claims, under Bivens, because Murchison failed to exhaust 
them.   
 Murchison moved to amend his complaint to name the United States as a 
defendant.  Without ruling on the motion, the District Court adopted the Magistrate 
Judge’s recommendation and entered judgment against Murchison.  We affirmed the 
dismissal of the constitutional claims.  However, because the District Court did not 
address Murchison’s motion to amend his complaint, we vacated in part and remanded to 
the District Court to grant Murchison leave to amend his FTCA claim unless the District 
Court found that amendment would be inequitable or futile.  Murchison v. Warden 
Lewisburg USP, 566 F. App’x 147, 150 (3d Cir. 2014) 
 On remand, the District Court determined that amendment would be futile 
because, while this case was pending on appeal, Murchison filed another complaint in 
which he alleged an FTCA claim that names the United States as a defendant for the 
same torts.  Moreover, Murchison’s complaint in this case alleged only constitutional tort 
claims, which are not cognizable under the FTCA.  Accordingly, the District Court 
entered judgment against Murchison.   
 Murchison appealed.  We have jurisdiction over his appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  We review for an abuse of discretion the District Court’s decision to deny 
Murchison an opportunity to amend his complaint.  See Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 
373 (3d Cir. 2000).  We may summarily affirm if the appeal presents no substantial 
questions.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.   
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  The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying as futile leave to amend 
Murchison’s FTCA claim.  Even if, as Murchison requested, the District Court permitted 
him to file a new complaint naming the proper defendant, his claims are only for 
constitutional torts—namely, violations of his First and Eighth Amendment rights—
which are not cognizable under the FTCA.  See Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 199 
(3d Cir. 2006).  Moreover, even if Murchison’s claims were framed in state tort law, and 
not as constitutional torts, his claims would not be cognizable under the FTCA because 
he alleged intentional torts only; and intentional torts are not cognizable under the FTCA.  
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h); see also Levin v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 1224, 1228 (2013).  In 
other words, amendment would have been futile because Murchison’s amended 
complaint would fail to state a claim under the FTCA.  See In re Burlington Coat Factory 
Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997) (defining futility).  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court.  Furthermore, we deny Murchison’s request “to 
re-asses [sic] and reconsider his changed or morfed [sic] financial obligations.” 
